In 2009, Iranian people came to the streets in opposition to suspected elections manipulation that led to the victory of the conservative presidential candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over his reformist challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi. Throughout this wave of protests, the protesters could not rely on Iranian domestic media or the internet.
than 128 kilobytes per seconds to make uploading any pictures or videos of street protests impossible (Opennet Report, 2013: 28 3 ). This reduction was followed by the filtering of certain websites, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The high level of limitations and the strict monitoring of the internet by the Iranian government and the Cyber Police decreased the efficiency of the internet in comparison to other types of media that were available at the time. It is important to mention that an unspecified number of people surpassed the regime's control over the internet by using anti-proxies and filter-breakers, but even if one thinks of this number as very high, the very low speed of the internet, specifically for the websites that required fast broadband access, clearly reduced their efficiency. 4 As a result, it is safe to state that "Twitter revolution" is not a familiar term for those who were in Iran at the time of the outbreak of the 2009 Green Movement. Golnaz
Esfandiari, an Iranian journalist, challenged usage of this term by referring to it as a "story that wrote itself." In an article written for Foreign Policy, she focuses on the exaggerated role of Twitter during the Green Movement, mostly by Iranian diaspora groups in the US and Europe alongside foreign governments (Esfandiari, 2010 Mehdi Jami, an Iranian journalist, blogger and filmmaker, claimed in an interview
with Tehran Review that "whatever the Green Movement has, it owes it to the media" (Mohtadi, 2011) . Therefore a question arises in relation to the main media platform of the protesters. As mentioned above, the Iranian government took a number of steps toward tightening its grip on the internet -and yet they proved incapable of preventing the demonstrations. Hence, in the absence of well-functioning internet connectivity and an independent media, how did the Iranian people coordinate several protests? What stood as a platform for the continuity of their demonstrations? In order to answer these questions, the article will examine two distinguished groups of media that were accessible to Iranians at that time: Iranian domestic media and the foreign-based Farsi-speaking satellite television channels.
Iranian domestic media
In Iran, constitutional provisions and laws set restrictions on content that can be offered by the media. Iranian domestic media is generally known for its lack of transparency and the limitations imposed on it by the government. Article 175 of the Iranian constitution guarantees the freedom of expression, as long as it is in line with Islamic criteria and serving the best interests of the country (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran). In other words, the freedom of expression is guaranteed as long as certain red lines are not 6 Semiocast is a market and opinion research company providing social media intelligence consumer insights, social media KPIs and social media solutions. 7 Percentage provided by Internet Live Stats. 8 The accuracy of such polls cannot be guaranteed, due to the fact that many people would avoid confirming their usage of any kind of social media in Iran under government's restrictions.
crossed. However, the main issue here is that there is no clear definition for these red lines, and therefore it is very difficult to foresee the threshold of the government's interests.
Starting with newspapers, they routinely face threats of closure by Iranian state authorities. The tough state control has turned the issue of continuity (of being published)
into a dominant concern of newspapers. By going back to Gittlin's idea of mutual dependency, it can be concluded that the Iranian protesters and the domestic media have not been mutually dependent on each other. In fact, it can be argued that none of them could serve the other's interests. In a nutshell, the nontransparent information and the lack of proper coverage of the protests discouraged people from solely relying on IRIB to get information about the ongoing political turmoil in the country.
The points mentioned above lead us to conclude that the growing pervasiveness of the Farsi-speaking foreign media outlets during the protests was not exclusively due to the popularity of these channels, but to the decreasing trust of the Iranians in their domestic media. This was an issue the foreign governments were fully aware of, and therefore a significant amount of money was poured into the development of the foreignbased Farsi channels such as BBC and VOA by their host countries (Ash, 2009 ).
Satellite TV
In Iran, satellite TV has always been banned as part of the resistance against a "cultural onslaught" that was theorized by conservative forces in the 1990s (Azizi, 2014: 30 ).
However, data shows that an estimated 68% of all the Iranian households have had illegal satellite receivers in 2009 (Vengar, 2016: 68), which is 6 times more than the number of internet users. It was therefore not unexpected that with all the limitations imposed on Iranian domestic media, the foreign-based outlets gained pivotal importance for the citizens.
Another point that put these channels one step ahead was the inability of the Iranian government to stand as a serious obstacle to their activities. These channels could neither be shut down nor filtered. The only effective measure that was taken towards them by the Iranian authorities was jamming (Ash, 2009) , which these channels circumvented by increasing the number of satellites carrying their signals.
However, it is important to mention that not all of the Farsi speaking channels These channels offered exactly what Iranian domestic media was not providing for the citizens. They were supporting or highlighting issues that the domestic media did not have the power to raise (Mohtadi, 2011) . Phone-in discussion programs provided an opportunity for the Iranian people to communicate internationally and to address the public directly. Programs such as BBC's "Nobate Shoma" 10 is one amongst many. These networks were also actively involved in providing anti-proxies to Iranians via email, to help them circumvent the Iranian censorship infrastructure (Opennet Initiative, 2013). As a result, not only did these channels play a major role in supporting the protesters, but they were occasionally used as a tool for coordinating purposes as well. The younger generation's coordinated practice of chanting "Allaho Akbar" from rooftops at nights is an example of acts that were advertised by Persian media abroad.
In addition, these channels offered close analysis of the political protests across the country. Former political figures appeared on different programs and shared their views on given matters. Many of these people were former political activists whose voice had a direct influence on the protesters. Ahmad Batebi, an Iranian political activist in exile and Abolhassan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic are examples in this regard.
In return, the contents of these channels and their visuals drew heavily on audience contribution. None of these channels were legally allowed to have a bureau in Iran, and Inevitably, these channels were also accused of having a negative impact on the political unrest. Bias, propaganda, and engaging people in "virtual" political activity (i.e.
diverting such activity to cyberspace) are some of the issues that these networks were blamed for. Furthermore, many argued that these channels only followed the strategic goals of the states they were funded by, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom in this case. They were referred to as the West's tools of a psychological warfare and a mouthpiece of world-guzzling capitalism (Voss, 2015: 554) . Furthermore, they might have focused on the protests as much as they were to increase their audiences. They were so fixated in promoting the anti-government demonstrations that sometimes they ignored the reasoning, ideology and demands behind the protests. Another criticism referred to the presence of the Iranian diaspora, with its different political standings, in connection to these channels (Lanzillo, 2011) .
Consequently, irrespective of the motives of these television channels during the protests, to a certain extent they managed to remove the cloud of suspicion that always existed around foreign media. By offering more transparency, the least they did was to let audiences choose the type of information they were willing to take in, an option that was not provided to them by any other type of mass media at the time.
Conclusion
The Iranian Green Movement provided an opportunity for the Farsi-speaking foreignbased channels to increase their viewership and credibility in Iranian society. Tough state censorship and increased internet restrictions following the protests gave Iranians an incentive to shift more towards Persian channels abroad. However, these channels were not licensed to cover the Iranian demonstrations on the ground, and, therefore, had it not been for citizens' voluntary reporting on the protests, they would not have had much coverage to share. The result of these constraints was the formation of a symbiotic relationship, which made the Iranian public and the foreign media dependent on each other. While these channels never proved to be consistent and committed solely to the mission of the media of informing people, they played a crucial role throughout the protests. It is reasonable to assume that at least some of these channels may have been acting in accordance to whatever framework was provided to them by their host countries, just as it is reasonable to assess that they had considerable impact on the public's mobilization and opinion.
At the time of writing this (Spring 2017), people in Iran trust neither the domestic media, nor the Farsi-speaking channels abroad. However, the viewership of the foreignbased channels has increased and they have managed to achieve greater acceptance within 
